Code of Civil Procedure section 577 defines a judgment as “the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding.” “[A] judgment, no matter how designated, is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action. Thus, an ‘order’ which is the final determination in the action is the judgment.” Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1606. “‘In “determining whether a particular decree is essentially interlocutory and nonappealable, or whether it is final and appealable . . . [i]t is not the form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is determinative. As a general test, which must be adapted to the particular circumstances of the individual case, it may be said that where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.”’” Melbostad v. Fisher (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 987, 995-996.
In Marshall v. Webber (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 275, 277, a well-reasoned decision, the defendant filed a special motion to strike the complaint pursuant to section 425.16. The motion was argued on March 1, 2018 and taken under submission by the court. Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at 277. On May 11, 2018, the court filed a five-page single spaced, signed order granting defendant’s motion. Id. The order “thoroughly discussed the relevant factual and legal issues before ruling that ‘[d]efendant’s special motion to strike the verified complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 is granted.”’ Id. at 277-278. “It further provided that ‘[d]efendant may file a noticed motion regarding his requested attorney fees and costs.”’[1] Id. at 278. On June 15, 2018, defendant filed his motion for attorney fees. Id. “On June 29, 2018 the court signed and filed a one-page order submitted by defendant’s attorney, entitled ‘Granting Special Motion of Daniel Webster to Strike Plaintiffs’ Verified Complaint.”’ Id. On July 30, 2018, defendant served a ‘Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order’ form, attaching the June 29, 2018 order. Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at 278. On August 9, 2018, plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court denied. Plaintiffs then appealed the decision. Id.
The Marshall court held that the “May 11 order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and striking the complaint was an appealable judgment, and that upon its entry and service by the clerk, the trial court lost jurisdiction to entertain or decide a motion for reconsideration.” Marshall, supra, at 281. The basis for the court’s ruling was that the May 11 order finally disposed of all causes of action against the defendant and invited him to file a motion for attorney fees. Id. at 281-284; see also Melbostad, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at 994. As the court observed:
Here, as in Melbostad, ‘the order granting defendants’ motion to strike was the final determination of the rights of the parties in this action. [Citations]. There was no issue left for future determination, and the order disposed of the entire case. . .’ [Citation]. As such, the May 11 order striking the complaint was a judgment from which no valid motion for reconsideration could lie and the time to appeal was not extended, even if the motion was timely filed under section 1008, subdivision (a) . . .
Id. at 284.
The Marshall holding that an anti-SLAPP motion order which strikes an entire complaint qualifies as a judgment has important consequences. First, since it is well-established that a judgment dispossesses a court from jurisdiction to reconsider its ruling, such an order prevents a plaintiff from filing a successful motion for reconsideration, which is a malpractice trap for the unwary plaintiff’s lawyer. Second, it can impact other deadlines, like the deadline to file a notice of appeal, or a memorandum of costs.
[1] The trial court made two entries on its register of actions in connection with the May 11 ruling. The first reads: “DECISION . . . 5/11/2018 [¶] Notes: Decision by [trial judge] as follows: Defendant’s special motion to strike the verified complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 is granted; copies mailed on 5/11/18. (EFF)” The other provides: “DISMISS LACK OF PROS . . . 05/11/2018 [¶] Notes: DISMISSED – Unprosecuted or on Court’s Motion: After Special Motion to Strike Granted (EFF).” Id.
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